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Abstract
Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has
recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible
logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning methods. So far no
relationship has been established between defeasible logic and mainstream nonmonotonic
reasoning approaches.
In this paper we establish close links to known semantics of logic programs. In particular,
we give a translation of a defeasible theory D into a meta-program P (D). We show that
under a condition of decisiveness, the defeasible consequences of D correspond exactly to
the sceptical conclusions of P (D) under the stable model semantics. Without decisiveness,
the result holds only in one direction (all defeasible consequences of D are included in all
stable models of P (D)). If we wish a complete embedding for the general case, we need
to use the Kunen semantics of P (D), instead.
KEYWORDS: Defeasible logic, stable semantics, Kunen semantics, non-monotonic logic.
1 Introduction
Defeasible reasoning is a nonmonotonic reasoning (Marek and Truszczynski 1993)
approach in which the gaps due to incomplete information are closed through the
use of defeasible rules that are usually appropriate. Defeasible logics were introduced
and developed by Nute (1994) over several years. These logics perform defeasible
reasoning, where a conclusion supported by a rule might be overturned by the effect
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of another rule. Roughly, a proposition p can be defeasibly proved (+∂p) only when
a rule supports it, and it has been demonstrated that no applicable rule supports
¬p; this demonstration makes use of statements −∂q which mean intuitively that an
attempt to prove q defeasibly has failed finitely. These logics also have a monotonic
reasoning component, and a priority on rules. One advantage of Nute’s design was
that it was aimed at supporting efficient reasoning, and in our work we follow that
philosophy.
Defeasible reasoning has recently attracted considerable interest. Its use in vari-
ous application domains has been advocated, including the modelling of regulations
and business rules (Morgensten 1998; Antoniou et al. 1999), modelling of contracts
(Grosof et al. 1999; Grosof 2004; Governatori 2005), legal reasoning (Prakken 1997;
Governatori et al. 2005), agent negotiations (Governatori et al. 2001), modelling of
agents and agent societies (Governatori and Rotolo 2004; Governatori and Padmanabhan 2003;
Governatori et al. 2004), and applications to the Semantic Web (Bassiliades et al. 2004;
Antoniou 2002). In fact, defeasible reasoning (in the form of courteous logic pro-
grams (Grosof 1997; Grosof et al. 1999)) provides a foundation for IBM’s Business
Rules Markup Language and for currentW3C activities on rules (Grosof and Poon 2003;
Grosof et al. 2002). In addition, defeasible theories, describing policies of business
activities, can be mined efficiently from appropriate datasets (Johnston and Governatori 2003).
Therefore defeasible reasoning is a promising subarea in nonmonotonic reasoning
as far as applications and integration to mainstream IT is concerned.
Recent theoretical work on defeasible logics has: (i) established some relationships
to other logic programming approaches without negation as failure (Antoniou et al. 2000);
(ii) analysed the formal properties of these logics (Antoniou et al. 2001; Maher 2000;
Maher 2001) as well as formal semantics for them in form of model theoretic se-
mantics (Maher 2002) and argumentation semantics (Governatori et al. 2004), and
(iii) has delivered efficient implementations (Maher et al. 2001).
However the problem remains that defeasible logic is not firmly linked to the
mainstream of nonmonotonic reasoning, in particular the semantics of logic pro-
grams. This paper aims at resolving this problem. We use the translation of a defea-
sible theoryD into a logic meta-programM proposed in (Maher and Governatori 1999).
For this translation we can show that, for the propositional case:
p is defeasibly provable in D ⇐⇒ p is included in all stable models ofM. (∗)
However this result can only be shown under the additional condition of decisive-
ness: the absence of cycles in the atom dependency graph.
If we wish to drop decisiveness, (∗) holds only in one direction, from left to
right. We show that if we wish the equivalence in the general case, we need to
use another semantics for logic programs, namely Kunen semantics (Kunen 1987).
In addition the possibility of cycles in the atom dependency graph of a defeasible
theory prevents Defeasible Logic to be characterised by well-founded semantics
(Gelder et al. 1991). It is possible to modify Defeasible Logic to accommodate well-
founded semantics (Maher and Governatori 1999) even if this results in a more
expensive computational model.
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the basics of defeasible
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logic and logic programming semantics, respectively. Section 4 presents our trans-
lation of defeasible theories in logic programs, while section 5 contains the main
results.
2 Defeasible Logic
2.1 A Language for Defeasible Reasoning
A defeasible theory (a knowledge base in defeasible logic) consists of five different
kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority
relation.
Facts are literals that are treated as known knowledge (given or observed facts
of a case).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
(e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Emus are
birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example
of such a rule is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ flies(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it
flies, unless there is other, not inferior, evidence suggesting that it may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is
to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible
rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an animal is heavy
then it might not be able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X)❀ ¬flies(X).
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence against the conclusion
that a heavy animal flies. In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬flies if heavy,
we simply want to prevent a conclusion flies.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that
is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given
the defeasible rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether
a bird with broken wings can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with
r′ > r, with the intended meaning that r′ is strictly stronger than r, then we can
indeed conclude that the bird cannot fly.
It is worth noting that, in defeasible logic, priorities are local in the following
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sense: Two rules are considered to be competing with one another only if they have
complementary heads. Thus, since the superiority relation is used to resolve conflicts
among competing rules, it is only used to compare rules with complementary heads;
the information r > r′ for rules r, r′ without complementary heads may be part of
the superiority relation, but has no effect on the proof theory.
2.2 Formal Definition
In this paper we restrict attention to essentially propositional defeasible logic. Rules
with free variables are interpreted as rule schemas, that is, as the set of all ground
instances; in such cases we assume that the Herbrand universe is finite. We assume
that the reader is familiar with the notation and basic notions of propositional logic.
If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p
then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
Rules are defined over a language (or signature) Σ, the set of propositions (atoms)
and labels that may be used in the rule.
A rule r : A(r) →֒ C(r) consists of its unique label r, its antecedent A(r) (A(r)
may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow →֒
(which is a placeholder for concrete arrows to be introduced in a moment), and its
head (or consequent) C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation
for antecedents and sometimes we omit the label when it is not relevant for the
context. There are three kinds of rules, each represented by a different arrow. Strict
rules use →, defeasible rules use ⇒, and defeaters use ❀.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, and the
set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with
consequent q.
A superiority relation on R is a relation > on R. When r1 > r2, then r1 is called
superior to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. Intuitively, r1 > r2 expresses that r1 overrules
r2, should both rules be applicable. > must be acyclic (that is, its transitive closure
must be irreflexive).
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of facts, R a
finite set of rules, and > an acyclic superiority relation on R.
2.3 Proof Theory
A conclusion of a defeasible theory D is a tagged literal. A conclusion has one of
the following four forms:
• +∆q, which is intended to mean that the literal q is definitely provable, using
only strict rules.
• −∆q, which is intended to mean that q is provably not definitely provable
(finite failure).
• +∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
• −∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly
provable in D.
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Provability is defined below. It is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof)
in D = (F,R,>). A derivation is a finite sequence P = P (1), . . . , P (n) of tagged
literals satisfying the following conditions. The conditions are essentially inference
rules phrased as conditions on proofs. P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence
P of length i.
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
That means, to prove +∆q we need to establish a proof for q using facts and strict
rules only. This is a deduction in the classical sense – no proofs for the negation of
q need to be considered (in contrast to defeasible provability below, where opposing
chains of reasoning must be taken into account, too).
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
To prove −∆q, i.e. that q is not definitely provable, q must not be a fact. In
addition, we need to establish that every strict rule with head q is known to be
inapplicable. Thus for every such rule r there must be at least one antecedent a for
which we have established that a is not definitely provable (−∆a).
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us illustrate this definition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have
two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to
argue using the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there
must be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now
we need to consider possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of ∼q.
To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that ∼q is not definitely
provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all rules which are not known
to be inapplicable and which have head ∼q (note that here we consider defeaters,
too, whereas they could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in line with
the motivation of defeaters given above). Essentially each such rule s attacks the
conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule s must be counterattacked by a
rule t with head q with the following properties: (i) t must be applicable at this
point, and (ii) t must be stronger than (i.e. superior to) s. Thus each attack on the
conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule.
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−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
To prove that q is not defeasibly provable, we must first establish that it is not
definitely provable. Then we must establish that it cannot be proven using the
defeasible part of the theory. There are three possibilities to achieve this: either we
have established that none of the (strict and defeasible) rules with head q can be
applied (2.1); or ∼q is definitely provable (2.2); or there must be an applicable rule
s with head ∼q such that no applicable rule t with head q is superior to s.
In general the inference conditions for a negative proof tag (i.e., −∆, −∂) explore
all the possibilities to derive a literal (with a given proof strength) before stating
that the literal is not provable (with the same proof strength). Thus conclusions
with these tags are the outcome of a constructive proof that the corresponding
positive conclusion cannot be obtained. As a result, there is a close relationship
between the inference rules for +∂ and −∂, (and also between those for +∆ and
−∆). The structure of the inference rules is the same, but the conditions are negated
in some sense. To be more precise the inference conditions for a negative proof tag
are derived from the inference conditions for the corresponding positive proof tag
by applying the Principle of Strong Negation introduced in (Antoniou et al. 2000).
The strong negation of a formula is closely related to the function that simplifies a
formula by moving all negations to an innermost position in the resulting formula
and replaces the positive tags with the respective negative tags and vice-versa.
The elements of a derivation are called lines of the derivation. We say that a
tagged literal L is provable in D = (F,R,>), denoted by D ⊢ L, iff there is a
derivation P in D such that L is a line of P .
Defeasible logic is closely related to several non-monotonic logics (Antoniou et al. 1999).
In particular, the “directly skeptical” semantics of non-monotonic inheritance net-
works (Horty et al. 1987) can be considered an instance of inference in DL once an
appropriate superiority relation, derived from the topology of the network, is fixed
(Billington et al. 1990).
A defeasible theoryD is coherent1 if for no literal p both D ⊢ +∆p and D ⊢ −∆p,
and D ⊢ +∂p and D ⊢ −∂p; and relatively consistent if whenever D ⊢ +∂p and
D ⊢ +∂∼p, for some p, then also D ⊢ +∆p and D ⊢ +∆∼p. Intuitively, coherence
says that no literal is simultaneously provable and unprovable. Consistency says
that a literal and its negation can both be defeasibly provable only when it and
its negation are definitely provable; hence defeasible inference does not introduce
1 Notice that here coherent has a different meaning than other works on logic programming for
example (Alferes and Pereira 1993a; Alferes and Pereira 1993b).
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inconsistency. A logic is coherent (relatively consistent) if the meaning of each
theory of the logic, when expressed as an extension (i.e., when we consider the set
of all the consequences of the theory), is coherent (relatively consistent), that is it
is not possible to prove a formula and its negation unless the monotonic part of the
theory proves them.
Proposition 2.1 (Billington 1993)
Defeasible logic is coherent and relatively consistent.
Consistency and coherence address the issue whether and how it is possible to
derive “conflicts” from defeasible theories. On the other side we can ask under which
conditions defeasible theories are complete, in the sense that for every literal in the
theory it is possible to decide whether the literal is provable/non provable from the
theory.
In the rest of this section we will study conditions under which it is possible to
guarantee completeness of a defeasible theory.
Given a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) a literal q is strictly unknowable in D iff
D 6⊢ +∆q and D 6⊢ −∆q. A literal is defeasibly unknowable in D iff D 6⊢ +∂q and
D 6⊢ −∂q. A literal is unknowable in D iff it is either strictly unknowable in D or
defeasibly unknowable in D.
The dependency graph of D, DG(D), is the directed graph defined as follows: the
set of points of DG(D) is {{q,∼q} : q is a literal in D}. The set of arcs of DG(D)
is {({b,∼b}, {a,∼a})|∃r ∈ Rs[b] : a ∈ A(r)}. Let U(D) be the subgraph of DG(D)
restricted to the literals that are unknowable in D, i.e., the set of points of U(D)
is {{q,∼q} : q is unknowable in D}.
The next Lemmata show the mutual relationships among unknowable literals in
a Defeasible theory, and general properties of graphs of unknowable literals.
Lemma 2.1
Let D = (F,R,>) be a Defeasible Theory. The out-degree of U(D) is at least 1.
Proof
We have to consider two cases: strictly unknowable literals and defeasibly unknow-
able literals.
Let q be a strictly unknowable literal, then there is a point {q,∼q} in U(D). Then,
by definition, D 6⊢ +∆q and D 6⊢ −∆q.2 Hence q /∈ F and ∀r ∈ Rs[q]∃a ∈ A(r) such
that D 6⊢ +∆a. Since D 6⊢ −∆q and q /∈ F , then ∃r ∈ Rs[q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r)
D 6⊢ −∆a. So ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) such that D 6⊢ +∆a and D 6⊢ −∆a. Thus
({q,∼q}, {a,∼a}) is an arc in U(D).
If q is a defeasibly unknowable literal then we reason as follows: let {q,∼q} be
the point in U(D) corresponding to q. Then D 6⊢ +∂q and D 6⊢ −∂q.
Since D 6⊢ +∂q we have the following:
2 The case of ∼q is identical.
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a1) D 6⊢ +∆q and
a2) one of the following three holds:
a2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[p]∃a ∈ A(r) : D 6⊢ +∂a; or
a2.2) D 6⊢ −∆∼q; or
a2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
a2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) D 6⊢ −∂a, and
a2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : D 6⊢ +∂a or t 6> s.
Since D 6⊢ −∂q we have the following.
b1) D 6⊢ −∆q; or
b2) All of the following three hold:
b2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) D 6⊢ −∂a, and
b2.2) D 6⊢ +∆∼q, and
b2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] either
b2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s), D 6⊢ +∂a; or
b2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t), D 6⊢ −∂a and t > s.
By a1, D 6⊢ +∆q. If b1 holds then q is strictly unknowable and we can repeat the
first part of the proof. So suppose that b2 holds.
If a2.1 holds then by b2.1 ∃r ∈ Rsd[p]∃a ∈ A(r) such that a is defeasibly unknow-
able in D. Thus ({q,∼q}, {a,∼a}) is an arc in U(D). If a2.2 holds then by b2.2 ∼p
is a strictly unknowable literal in D, and we have already proved the property in
this case.
So suppose that a2.3 holds. If b2.3 holds then ∃s ∈ R[∼p]∃a ∈ A(s) such that a is
a defeasibly unknowable literal in D. Thus ({q,∼q}, {a,∼a}) is an arc in U(D). So
suppose that b2.3.2 holds. Then t > s and so a2.3.2 holds. Hence ∃t ∈ Rsd[q]∃a ∈
A(t) such that a is defeasibly unknowable in D. Thus ({q,∼q}, {a,∼a}) is an arc
in U(D).
Therefore in all cases the out-degree of {q,∼q} is at least 1.
Given a graph, a walk is an alternating sequence of vertices and edges, with each
edge being incident to the vertices immediately preceeding and succeeding it in the
sequence.
The set of points in a walk W in the dependency graph of a theory D is denoted
by Points(W ). A walk W ends in a cycle iff W is finite and the last point of W
occurs at least twice. A walk is complete iff either
1. Points(W ) is infinite; or
2. a point in W has out-degree zero; or
3. W ends in a cycle.
Lemma 2.2
Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasibly theory. Then the following are equivalent.
1. There is a literal which is unknowable in D.
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2. U(D) is not empty.
3. There is a walk in U(D).
4. There is a complete walk in U(D).
5. There is a complete walk in U(D) and whenever W is a complete walk in
U(D) then either Points(W ) is infinite or W ends in a cycle.
Proof
1 and 2 are clearly equivalent. If 2 holds then by Lemma 2.1, 3 holds. If 3 holds,
then 4 holds since every walk can be extended to a complete walk. By Lemma 2.1,
every point in U(D) has out-degree of at least 1, and so if 4 holds, then 5 holds. If
5 holds since walks are not empty 2 holds.
A defeasible theory D is called decisive iff the dependency graph of D is acyclic.
The following proposition provides a sufficient condition to determine complete-
ness of a defeasible theory.
Theorem 2.1
If D is decisive, then for each literal p:
(a) either D ⊢ +∆p or D ⊢ −∆p
(b) either D ⊢ +∂p or D ⊢ −∂p.
Proof
We prove the contrapositive, i.e., suppose there are unknowable literals. If there
are unknowable literals then by Lemma 2.2, there is a walk in U(D) such that
Points(W ) is infinite or W ends in a cycle. Since there are only finitely many rules
in D, Points(W ) is finite, thusW ends in a cycle. Thus U(D) has a cycle and U(D)
is a subgraph of DG(D), thus D is not decisive.
Not every defeasible theory satisfies this property. For example, in the theory
consisting of the single rule
r1 : p⇒ p
neither −∂p nor +∂p is provable.
Notice, however, that there are complete non decisive theories. If we extend the
above theory with the rule
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
and the superiority relation > is defined as r2 > r1 then we can prove both −∂p
and +∂¬p, thus the resulting theory is not decisive, but complete.
2.4 A Bottom-Up Characterization of Defeasible Logic
The proof theory provides the basis for a top-down (backward-chaining) implemen-
tation of the logic. In fact the Deimos system (Maher et al. 2001) is based directly
on the proof theory described above. However, there are advantages to a bottom-
up (forward-chaining) implementation. In particular this presentation of Defeasible
Logic provides a both a set theoretic and a declarative computational model of the
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logic compared to the procedural characterisation of the top-down definitions. This
allows us to describe a defeasible theory as an extension (i.e., set of all conclusions
provable from it) and to deal with finite as well as infinite theories. This is not
possible in the other approach since derivations are required to be finite sequences
of (tagged) literals and they are described in term of combinatorial constructions.
Furthermore, a bottom-up definition of the logic provides a bridge to later con-
siderations. For these reasons we now provide a bottom-up definition of Defeasible
Logic.
We associate with D an operator TD which works on 4-tuples of sets of literals.
We call such 4-tuples an extension.
TD(+∆,−∆,+∂,−∂) = (+∆′,−∆′,+∂′,−∂′) where
+∆′ = F ∪ {q | ∃r ∈ Rs[q] A(r) ⊆ +∆}
−∆′ = −∆ ∪ ({q | ∀r ∈ Rs[q] A(r) ∩ −∆ 6= ∅} − F )
+∂′ = +∆ ∪ {q | ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] A(r) ⊆ +∂,
∼q ∈ −∆, and
∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
A(s) ∩−∂ 6= ∅, or
∃t ∈ R[q] such that
A(t) ⊆ +∂ and t > s}
−∂′ = {q ∈ −∆ | ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] A(r) ∩ −∂ 6= ∅, or
∼q ∈ +∆, or
∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that A(s) ⊆ +∂ and
∀t ∈ R[q] either
A(t) ∩−∂ 6= ∅, or
t 6> s}
The set of extensions forms a complete lattice under the pointwise containment
ordering3, with ⊥ = (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) as its least element. The least upper bound operation
is the pointwise union4, which is represented by ∪.
The sequence of repeated applications of TD to ⊥, called the Kleene sequence of
TD, is defined as follows:
• TD ↑ 0 = ⊥;
• TD ↑ (α+ 1) = TD(TD ↑ α);
• TD ↑ α =
⋃
β<α TD ↑ β if α is a limit ordinal.
3 (a1, a2, a3, a4) ≤ (b1, b2, b3, b4) iff ai ⊆ bi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
4 Given two n-tuple of sets a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , b2) the pointwise union of a and b
is defined as follows: a ∪ b = (a1 ∪ b1, . . . , an ∪ bn).
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Proposition 2.2
TD is monotonic and the Kleene sequence from ⊥ is increasing. Thus the limit
F = (+∆F ,−∆F ,+∂F ,−∂F ) of all finite elements in the sequence exists, and TD
has a least fixpoint L = (+∆L,−∆L,+∂L,−∂L). When D is a finite propositional
defeasible theory F = L.
Proof
We prove by induction that TD is pointwise monotonic. The other properties follow
from standard and well-know set theoretic arguments.
The inductive base is trivial since the elements of ⊥ are ∅.
For the inductive step we have four cases, where the inductive hypothesis amounts
to: +∆n−1 ⊆ +∆n, −∆n−1 ⊆ −∆n, +∂n−1 ⊆ +∂n and −∂n−1 ⊆ −∂n.
Case +∆. Let us investigate the reasons why p ∈ +∆n: if p ∈ F , then, trivially, for
all m p ∈ +∆m; hence p ∈ +∆n+1. Otherwise ∃r ∈ Rs[p] such that A(r) ⊆ +∆n−1.
By inductive hypothesis A(r) ⊆ +∆n. Therefore p ∈ +∆n+1.
Case −∆. Trivial since −∆n+1 = −∆n ∪ S, for some set of literals S.
Case +∂. If p ∈ +∂n because p ∈ +∆n−1, then by inductive hypothesis p ∈ +∆n
and thus p ∈ +∂n+1. Otherwise p ∈ +∂n if (i) ∃r ∈ Rsd[p] such that A(r) ⊆ +∂n−1
and (ii) ∼p ∈ −∆n−1 and ∀s ∈ R[∼p] either (iii) A(s)∩−∂n−1 6= ∅ or (iv) ∃t ∈ R[p]
such that A(t) ⊆ +∂n−1 and t > s. By inductive hypothesis, if (i) then A(r) ⊆ +∂n,
if (ii) then ∼p ∈ −∆n, if (iii) then A(s) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅, and if (iv) then A(t) ⊆ +∂n.
Therefore every time the conditions for p being in +∂n are satisfied, so are those
for p being in +∂n+1.
Case −∂. First of all, by definition, −∂n ⊆ −∆n, then we have three possibilities
to add a literal p to −∂n+1. (i) ∀r ∈ Rsd[p]A(r)∩−∂n−1 6= ∅. by inductive hypothesis
−∂n−1 ⊆ −∂n, thus A(r) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅, hence p ∈ −∂n+1. (ii) ∼p ∈ +∆n−1, but by
inductive hypothesis +∆n−1 ⊆ +∆n, thus p ∈ −∂n+1. (iii) ∃s ∈ R[∼p] such that
A(s) ⊆ +∂n−1 and ∀t ∈ R[p] either A(t) ∩ −∂n−1 6= ∅ or t 6> s. By inductive
hypothesis +∂n−1 ⊆ +∂n and −∂n−1 ⊆ −∂n. Therefore, also in this case, p ∈
−∂n+1. Hence p ∈ −∂n+1.
The extension F captures exactly the inferences described in the proof theory.
Theorem 2.2
Let D be a finite propositional defeasible theory, q a literal and
F = (+∆F ,−∆F ,+∂F ,−∂F )
is the limit of all finite elements of the Kleene sequence from ⊥ via TD.
Then:
• D ⊢ +∆q iff q ∈ +∆F
• D ⊢ −∆q iff q ∈ −∆F
• D ⊢ +∂q iff q ∈ +∂F
• D ⊢ −∂q iff q ∈ −∂F
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Proof
We prove the theorem by induction on the length of derivations in one direction
and on the number of iterations of the operator TD in the other.
Case +∆, Inductive base ⇒. P (1) = +∆q. This means that either q ∈ F or that
there exists a rule r ∈ Rs[q] such that A(r) = ∅. In both cases q ∈ +∆1F . In the
first case by definition, in the second since ∅ ⊆ +∆0 = ∅. By the monotonicity of
TD, q ∈ +∆F .
Inductive step. We assume that the theorem holds for proofs of length up to n,
and P (n+ 1) = +∆q. Here we consider only the cases different from the inductive
base. Thus there exists a rule r ∈ Rs[q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r), +∆a ∈ P (1..n).
By inductive hypothesis a ∈ +∆F . Let +∆m be the minimal set of literals in the
Kleene sequence defined by TD containing all such as. Clearly A(r) ⊆ ∆m+1. Hence,
by the monotonicity of TD, q ∈ +∆F .
Inductive base ⇐. If q ∈ +∆1, then either q ∈ F or ∃r ∈ Rs[q] : A(r) ⊆ +∆0,
that is A(r) = ∅. In both case we have that +∆q is a single line proof of q.
Inductive step. We have that q ∈ +∆n+1 and the property holds up to +∆n. If
q ∈ +∆n+1 because q ∈ F , then, as in the previous case, +∆q is a single line proof
of q. Otherwise ∃r ∈ Rs[q] : A(r) ⊆ +∆n. By inductive hypothesis ∀ai ∈ A(r),
D ⊢ +∆ai. Let a1, . . . , al be an enumeration of the literals in A(r), and let P (ai)
be a proof of ai. We concatenate the P (ai)s and we append +∆q at the end. It is
immediate to verify that the sequence thus obtained is a proof of +∆q.
Case −∆, Inductive base ⇒. P (1) = −∆q iff p /∈ F and ¬∃r ∈ Rs such that
C(r) = q. On the other hand −∆0 = ∅, so the set of literals satisfying ∀s ∈ Rs[q] :
A(s) ∩ −∆0 6= ∅ is the set of literals not appearing as the consequent in a strict
rule in D. Moreover the definition of relative complement gives us
−∆1 = {p|¬∃r ∈ Rs ∧ p /∈ F}
Therefore q ∈ −∆1, and by the monotonicity of TD, q ∈ −∆F .
Inductive step. Let us assume that the property holds up to n and P (n + 1) =
−∆p. This implies 1) p /∈ F and 2) ∀r ∈ Rs[p]∃q ∈ A(r) such that −∆q ∈ P (1..n).
By inductive hypothesis, for some m, q ∈ −∆m and so A(r) ∩ −∆m 6= ∅, thus
p ∈= ∆m+1 and therefore by the monotonicity of TD it is in −∆F .
Inductive base⇐. As we have seen −∆1 = {p|¬∃r ∈ Rs∧p /∈ F}, thus, vacuously,
we have a single line proof of −∆q.
Inductive step. Let us assume that the property holds up to n, and let us suppose
that q /∈ −∆n, but q ∈ −∆n+1. This implies that q /∈ F and ∀r ∈ Rs[q] : A(r) ∩
−∆n 6= ∅. This means that ∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃ar ∈ A(r) such that D ⊢ −∆ar. Let P (a)
be a derivation of a, and P (a1), . . . , P (ar) be the concatenation of the proofs of such
as. We append −∆q at the end and we obtain a proof of −∆q, thus D ⊢ −∆q.
Cases +∂ and −∂. Inductive base, ⇒. The tags +∂ and −∂, as well as the
corresponding sets of literals, depend on each other, so we will carry out the proofs
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simultaneously. Moreover, since the tags +∆ and −∆ (and the sets of literal corre-
sponding to them) are independent from +∂ and −∂ –and we have already proved
the theorem for them– we assume, without any loss of generality, that derivations
in defeasible logic consist only of defeasible tagged literals.
Case P (1) = +∂q. This is possible if 1) q ∈ +∆F , or 2) ∼q ∈ −∆F and ∃r ∈
Rsd[q] such that A(r) = ∅ and there are no rules for ∼p. For 1) by the definition of
TD there exists an n such that q ∈ +∆n, then q ∈ +∂n+1; by the monotonicity of
TD q ∈ +∂F . For 2) we have that A(r) is included in every +∂n, and the condition
beginning with ∀r ∈ R[∼q] is vacuously satisfied since R[∼q] = ∅. Let −∆m be the
minimal set in the Kleene sequence generated by TD such that ∼q ∈ −∆m. Then
we can conclude that q ∈ +∂n+1; therefore q ∈ +∂F .
Case P (1) = −∂q. First of all, let us consider the following decomposition of
−∂n+1
−∂n+1 = −∂n+1
∩
∪−∂n+1∆ ∪ −∂
n+1
>
where
−∂n+1
∩
= {p ∈ −∆n|∀r ∈ Rsd[p], A(r) ∩ −∂
n 6= ∅}
−∂n+1∆ = {p ∈ −∆
n|∼p ∈ +∆n}
−∂n+1> = {p ∈ −∆
n|∀r ∈ Rsd[p] ∃s ∈ R[∼p] : A(s) ⊆ +∂n and
∀t ∈ Rsd[p] : either A(t) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅ or t 6> s}
Now P (1) = −∂q is possible if D ⊢ −∆q and either
1. D ⊢ +∆q or
2. Rsd[∼q] = ∅ or
3. ∃s ∈ R[∼q] : A(s) = ∅ and ¬∃t ∈ R[q] : t > s
From the previous cases we have q ∈ −∆F and for 1) ∼q ∈ +∆F . Let n be the
minimum number of iterations of TD such that both q ∈ −∆n and q ∈ +∆n; then
by construction q ∈ +∂n+1. For 2) we obtain that q ∈ −∂n+1∩ and q ∈ −∂
n+1
> since
the conditions are vacuously satisfied. Finally 3) implies that A(s) ⊆ +∂n for any
n and ∀t ∈ R[q], t 6> s; thus q ∈ −∂n+1> for some n such that q ∈ +∆
n.
Inductive step.
Case P (n + 1) = +∂q. Let us assume that the inductive hypothesis holds for
derivations of length up to n. We only show the cases different from the induc-
tive base. This means that we have cases corresponding to clause 2) of the proof
conditions for +∂. From the inductive hypothesis we have A(r) ⊆ +∂F for some
r ∈ Rsd[q] (clause 2.2), ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either A(s) ∩ −∂F 6= ∅ (clause 2.3.1) or
∃t ∈ Rsd[q] : t > s and A(t) ⊆ +∂F (clause 2.3.2). By the monotonicity of TD
we get that a minimum n such that +∂n and −∂n that satisfy the above condition
exists. Therefore q ∈ +∂n+1 and consequently q ∈ +∂F .
Case P (n + 1) = −∂q. Here we have 1) q ∈ −∆F , and either 2) ∼q ∈ +∆F or
3) the clause 2.1 of the proof condition for −∂ is not vacuously satisfied: in such a
case ∀r ∈ Rsd[p]:
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2.1 ∃p ∈ A(r) such that −∂q ∈ P (1..n); by inductive hypothesis p ∈ −∂F , so for
some m, A(r) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅.
2.3 ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
2.3.1 ∀ai ∈ A(s) + ∂ai ∈ P (1..n); by inductive hypothesis each qi ∈ +∂F ,
therefore for some m, A(s) ⊆ +∂m; or
2.3.2 ∀t ∈ R[q] either t 6> s, or ∃a ∈ A(t) such that −∂q ∈ P (1..n). By
inductive hypothesis a ∈ −∂F , then, for some m A(t) ∩−∂m 6= ∅.
Also in this case it is immediate to see that each condition has been reduced to the
correspondent condition required for the construction of −∂m+1, therefore, for the
smallest m satisfying the above three conditions we can conclude q ∈ −∂m+1, and,
by the monotonicity of TD, q ∈ −∂F .
Inductive base, ⇐.
Case q ∈ +∂1. If q ∈ +∂1 because it is in +∆F , then we have that D ⊢ +∆q. Let
P be a proof of +∆q; we append +∂q at the end of P obtaining a proof of +∂q.
For the other case we have
∃r ∈ Rsd[q] : A(r) = ∅ and ∀s ∈ R[∼q] ∃t ∈ R[q] : A(t) = ∅, t > s
In this case it is easy to verify that +∂q is a single line proof for q.
Case q ∈ −∂1. Here we have that q ∈ −∆F and the following three cases:
1. ∼q ∈ +∆F
2. Rsd[q] = ∅
3. ∃r ∈ R[∼q] : A(r) = ∅ and ∀t ∈ R[q], t 6> r
In the first case, we have already proved that D ⊢ +∆q and D ⊢ −∆q. So let P
the concatenation of the proofs of +∆q and −∆q. We append −∂q at the end of P
and we obtain a derivation of −∂q. For 2) the sequence −∆q,−∂q is vacuously a
derivation of −∂q, and for 3) the concatenation of a proof of −∆q and −∂q satisfies
condition 3 of the definition of −∂.
Inductive step. We assume that the theorem holds up to +∂n and −∂n. Fur-
thermore it is worth noting that the construction of derivation of defeasible literals
in Defeasible Logic and the construction of the corresponding sets of literals are
invertible, i.e., each time the top-down (procedural) condition requires something
to be provable, the bottom-up (set-theoretic) condition satisfies an appropriate set-
theoretic condition. But we have seen that, granted the inductive hypothesis the
proof-theoretic condition and the set-theoretic one coincide.
Case q ∈ +∂n+1. The difference with the inductive base is that now we replace
A(r) = ∅, A(t) = ∅ with A(r) ⊆ +∂n, A(t) ⊆ +∂n, and A(s) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅. By the
inductive hypothesis we have ∀ar ∈ A(r) : D ⊢ +∂ar, ∀at ∈ A(t) : D ⊢ +∂at,
and ∃as ∈ A(s) : D ⊢ −∂as. Let P be a concatenation of the derivations of the
just mentioned tagged literals. We append +∂q at the end of P and we obtain a
derivation of +∂q.
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Case q ∈ −∂n+1. First of all we can use an argument similar to the previous
case. Here the main difference with the inductive base is that we have to consider
that the set of supportive rules for q is not empty and we have to consider the
case where ∀r ∈ Rsd[q], A(r) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅. By inductive hypothesis we have that
∀r ∈ Rsd[q]∃ar ∈ A(r) : D ⊢ −∂ar. At this stage we can concatenate the derivations
of such ars with the other required derivations and we append −∂q at the end. Again
we can verify that the resulting sequence is a proof for −∂q.
2.5 Beyond Propositional Defeasible Logic
The restriction of Theorem 2.2 to finite propositional theories derives from the
formulation of the proof theory; proofs are guaranteed to be finite under this
restriction. Defeasible Logic has a constructive proof theory that guarantees the
explainability of conclusions (i.e., for every conclusion we derive, it is possible
to provide a full proof with justification of the essential steps). In addition the
proof theory defines the classical defeasible logic of (Antoniou et al. 2001) and
(Billington et al. 1990).
On the other hand, the bottom-up semantics does not need this restriction, and
so can be used in conjunction with predicate defeasible logic rules that represent
infinitely many propositional rules. This also means that under this characterisation
defeasible logic can be supplemented with function symbols. In the following we
will take advantage of this opportunity and provide a more elegant and general
characterisation under the Kunen semantics (Section 3.2 and 5.3), while in the
remaining sections we stick to the original definition.
3 Semantics of Logic Programs
Now that we have presented defeasible logic and have developed the technical prop-
erties that will be needed later on, we turn to the theme of this paper: establish
formal connections between defeasible logic and logic programming semantics. This
section presents the basics of the semantics that will be used in subsequent sections
A logic program P is a finite set of program clauses. A program clause r has the
form
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
where A,B1, . . . Bn, C1, . . . , Cm are positive literals. A program clause with vari-
ables is considered to represent the set of its ground instances.
In this paper we will make use of two well-known logic programming seman-
tics: stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and Kunen semantics
(Kunen 1987). In the following we present them briefly for the sake of completeness.
3.1 Stable Model Semantics
Let M be a subset of the Herbrand base. We call a ground program clause
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
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irrelevant w.r.t. M if at least one Ci is included in M . Given a logic program P ,
ground(P ) is the set of ground instances of the logic program P , and we define
the reduct of P w.r.t. M , denoted by PM , to be the logic program obtained from
ground(P ) by
1. removing all clauses that are irrelevant w.r.t. M , and
2. removing all premises not Ci from all remaining program clauses.
Note that the reduct PM is a definite logic program, and we are no longer faced
with the problem of assigning semantics to negation, but can use the least Herbrand
model instead.
M is a stable model of P iffM =MPM , whereMPM is the least Herbrand model
of the reduct of P .
3.2 Kunen Semantics
Kunen semantics (Kunen 1987) is a 3-valued semantics for logic programs. A partial
interpretation is a mapping from ground atoms to one of the three truth values t,
f and u, which denote true, false and unknown, respectively. This mapping can be
extended to arbitrary formulas using Kleene’s 3-valued logic.
Kleene’s truth tables can be summarized as follows. If ϕ is a boolean combination
of atoms with truth value one of t, f and u, its truth value is t iff all possible ways of
putting t or f for the various u-values lead to a value t being computed in ordinary
(2-valued) logic; ϕ gets the value f iff ¬ϕ gets the value t; and ϕ gets the value
u otherwise. These truth values can be extended in the obvious way to predicate
logic, thinking of the quantifiers as infinite conjunctions or disjunctions.
The Kunen semantics of a program P is obtained from a sequence {In} of partial
interpretations, defined as follows:
1. I0(a) = u for every atom a.
2. In+1(a) = t iff there is a program clause
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
and a ground substitution σ such that a = Aσ and that
In((B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧ ¬C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Cm)σ) = t.
3. In+1(a) = f iff for all clauses
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
in the program, and all ground substitutions σ, if a = Aσ then
In((B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧ ¬C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Cm)σ) = f .
4. In+1(a) = u if neither 2. nor 3. applies.
We shall say that the Kunen semantics of P supports a formula ϕ, written P |=K ϕ,
iff there is an interpretation In, for some finite n, such that In(ϕ) = t.
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4 A Translation of Defeasible Theories into Logic Programs
In this section we describe a meta-program M in a logic programming form that
expresses the essence of the defeasible reasoning embedded in defeasible logic first
introduced in (Maher and Governatori 1999). M consists of the following clauses.
We first introduce the predicates defining classes of rules, namely
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body):-
strict(Name,Head,Body).
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body):-
defeasible(Name,Head,Body).
rule(Name,Head,Body):-
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body).
rule(Name,Head,Body):-
defeater(Name,Head,Body).
Next we introduce the clauses defining the predicates corresponding to +∆, −∆,
+∂, and −∂. These clauses specify the structure of defeasible reasoning in defeasible
logic. Arguably they convey the conceptual simplicity of defeasible logic more clearly
than the proof theory.
c1 definitely(X):-
fact(X).
c2 definitely(X):-
strict(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yl]),
definitely(Y1),. . . ,definitely(Yn).
c3 defeasibly(X):-
definitely(X).
c4 defeasibly(X):-
not definitely(∼ X),
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yl]),
defeasibly(Y1),. . . ,defeasibly(Yn),
not overruled(R,X).
c5 overruled(R,X):-
rule(S,∼ X, [U1, . . . , Ul]),
defeasibly(U1),. . . ,defeasibly(Un),
not defeated(S,∼ X).
c6 defeated(S,∼ X):-
sup(T, S),
supportive rule(T,X, [V1, . . . , Vl]),
defeasibly(V1),. . . ,defeasibly(Vn).
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The first two clauses address definite provability, while the remainder address
defeasible provability. The clauses specify if and how a rule can be overridden by
another, and which rules can be used to defeat an overriding rule, among other
aspects of the structure of defeasible reasoning in defeasible logic.
We have permitted ourselves some syntactic flexibility in presenting the meta-
program. However, there is no technical difficulty in using conventional logic pro-
gramming syntax to represent this program.
Finally, for a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>), we add facts according to the
following guidelines:
1. fact(p). for each p ∈ F
2. strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn → p ∈ R
3. defeasible(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn ⇒ p ∈ R
4. defeater(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn ❀ p ∈ R
5. sup(ri, rj). for each pair of rules such that ri > rj
5 Properties of the Translation
5.1 Embedding under Stable Model Semantics
We establish relationships between D and its translation M. To do so we must
select appropriate logic program semantics to interpret not in clauses c4 and c5.
First we consider stable model semantics.
The aim of this section is twofold. On one hand it established a relationship
between Defeasible Logic and stable semantics. This connection is obtained via the
representation of the meta-program for Defeasible Logic as a Default Theory. In
this way we are able to use the well-know and well-understood link between stable
semantics and Default Logic to simplify the proofs of our results and, at the same
time, it opens the way to investigations on the similarities and differences over
the two non-monotonic formalisms. Furthermore it will enable further studies on
relationships between semantics for default logic and defeasible logic.
To this end we briefly rehearse the basic definitions of default logic.
5.1.1 Basics of Default Logic
A default δ has the form ϕ:ψ1,...,ψn
χ
with closed formulas ϕ, ψ1, . . .,ψn, χ. ϕ is
the prerequisite pre(δ), ψ1, . . . , ψn the justifications just(δ), and χ the consequent
cons(δ) of δ.
A default theory T is a pair (W,Def) consisting of a set of formulas W and a
countable set Def of defaults.
Let δ = ϕ:ψ1,...,ψn
χ
be a default, and E a deductively closed set of formulas. We
say that δ is applicable to E iff ϕ ∈ E, and ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn 6∈ E.
Let Π = (δ0, δ1, δ2, . . .) be a finite or infinite sequence of defaults from Def
without multiple occurrences (modelling an application order of defaults fromDef).
We denote by Π[k] the initial segment of Π of length k, provided the length of Π is
at least k.
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• In(Π) = Th(W ∪{cons(δ) | δ occurs in Π}), where Th denotes the deductive
closure.
• Out(Π) = {¬ψ | ψ ∈ just(δ), δ occurs in Π}.
Π is called a process of T iff δk is applicable to In(Π[k]), for every k such that δk
occurs in Π. Π is successful iff In(Π)∩Out(Π) = ∅, otherwise it is failed. Π is closed
iff every default that is applicable to In(Π) already occurs in Π.
Antoniou (1997) showed that Reiter’s (1980) original definition of extensions is
equivalent to the following one: A set of formulas E is an extension of a default
theory T iff there is a closed and successful process Π of T such that E = In(Π).
5.1.2 Stable Models and Default Logic
The Default Logic interpretation of a ground program clause Cl
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
is given by the default
df(Cl) =
B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn : ¬ C1, . . . ,¬ Cm
A
.
We define df(P ), the default logic interpretation of the logic program P , to be the
default theory (W,D) with W = ∅ and D = {df(Cl) | Cl ∈ ground(P )}.
Theorem 5.1 (Antoniou 1997)
Let P be a logic program, and M a subset of the Herbrand base. M is a stable
model of P iff Th(M) is an extension of df(P ).
5.2 The Meta-Program as a Default Theory
According to the previous section, the meta-program of section 4 can be equivalently
viewed as the following default theory T (D) = (W (D), Def(D)).
The predicate logic part W (D) contains:
1. fact(p) for each p ∈ F
2. strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn → p ∈ R
3. defeasible(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn ⇒ p ∈ R
4. defeater(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]). for each rule ri : q1, . . . , qn ❀ p ∈ R
5. sup(ri, rj). for each pair of rules such that ri > rj
And the following defaults (actually default schemas) are elements of Def(D):
d1 =
fact(X):
definitely(X)
d2 =
strict(R,X,[Y1,...,Yn])∧definitely(Y1)∧...∧definitely(Yn):
definitely(X)
d3 =
definitely(X):
defeasibly(X)
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d4 =
supportive rule(R,X,[Y1,...,Yn])∧defeasibly(Y1)∧...∧defeasibly(Yn):
¬ definitely(∼X),¬ overruled(R,X)
defeasibly(X)
d5 =
rule(S,∼X,[U1,...,Un])∧defeasibly(U1)∧...∧defeasibly(Un):¬ defeated(S,∼X)
overruled(R,X)
d6 =
sup(T,S)∧supportive rule(T,X,[V1,...,Vn])∧defeasibly(V1)∧...∧defeasibly(Vn):
defeated(S,X)
d7 =
strict(Name,Head,Body):
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body)
d8 =
defeasible(Name,Head,Body):
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body)
d9 =
supportive rule(Name,Head,Body):
rule(Name,Head,Body)
d10 =
defeater(Name,Head,Body):
rule(Name,Head,Body)
Now let us prove a technical result on this default theory. It provides a condition
on D under which T (D) has at least one extension.
Lemma 5.1
Let D be a decisive defeasible theory. Then T (D) has at least one extension.
Proof
If the atom dependency graph of D is acyclic we can define an arbitrary total order
≫ on atoms which respects the dependency graph. We proceed to construct a closed
and successful process Π as follows:
1. First apply instantiations of d1 and d2 in any order. These defaults have no
justification, so success cannot be jeopardized.
2. Then proceed to prove defeasibly(p) or defeasibly(¬p) using the remaining
defaults, in the order of ≫.
3. For each atom p, try to apply first defaults d3, then d6, then d5 and finally d4.
If the defaults can be applied in this order only, the process Π cannot fail.
4. Π is closed when we have carried out step 3 for all atoms p.
The question is whether the order specified in 3 can always be respected. This is
the case because Yi, Ui and Vi use atoms appearing before X in the total order.
The argument in more detail: we analyze the situation where an instantiation of
d4 with p has impact on an earlier application of d5 with instantiation ∼q. Suppose
defeasibly(p) is derived using default d4 at stage k, and suppose it is then used
to prove overruled(r, q) later in the process Π, where defeasibly(q) was derived
in Π at a stage l < k. But then p occurs in the body of a rule with head predicate
q, so q depends on p, so it must appear after p in ≫. So, according to 2 above, d4
with instantiation q cannot have been applied before d4 with instantiation p, so we
have a contradiction.
A similar argument applies to the interplay between defaults d5 and d6.
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In general, T (D) may not have any extension if the condition of the Lemma is
not satisfied. For example consider D consisting of the rules:
r1 : ⇒ p
r2 : p⇒ q
r3 : q ⇒ ¬p
Let us now analyze the application of defaults in T (D).
Because of r1 we derive immediately overruled(r3) using d5 with instantiation
r3 for R and r1 for S. r1 cannot be defeated using d6 because there is no stronger
rule. No interaction with other defaults can prevent this application of d5, so it can
appear at the beginning of any process, without loss of generality.
Then we can apply d4 to derive defeasibly(p), assuming ¬ overruled(r1, p) (∗).
Now that defeasibly(p) is derived, we can apply d4 to derive defeasibly(q),
assuming ¬ overruled(r2, q).
We apply d5 with instantiation r3 for S and r1 for R to derive overruled(r1, p).
This contradicts the previous assumption (∗), so the process is failed.
There is no way any defaults along the process above can be blocked by applying
another default instead. So there can be no extension.
We are now able to prove the main results, namely the relationships between
Defeasible Logic and the stable semantics interpretation of the meta-program de-
scribing provability in Defeasible Logic.
Theorem 5.2
(a) If D ⊢ +∆p then definitely(p) is included in all stable models of M.
(b) If D ⊢ −∆p then definitely(p) is not included in any stable model of M.
(c) If D is decisive then the implications (a) and (b) are also true in the opposite
direction.
Proof
(a): Proof by induction on the length of derivations P in D. Let the claim hold for
P (1..i), and let P (i + 1) = +∆p. Let E be an extension of T (D), and E = In(Π)
for a closed and successful process Π of T (D).
Case 1: p ∈ F . Then fact(p) ∈ W (D). Since d1 is applicable to In(Π) and Π is
closed, we conclude definitely(p) ∈ In(Π) = E.
Case 2: There is r ∈ Rs[p] such that +∆a ∈ P (1..i) for all a ∈ A(r). Since
r ∈ Rs[p] we have strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) ∈ Def(D). Since +∆qj ∈ P (1..i), for all
j = 1, . . . , n, we conclude with Induction Hypothesis that definitely(qj) ∈ E =
In(Π). Thus d2 is applicable to In(Π). Π is closed so definitely(p) ∈ In(Π) = E.
(b): The proof goes by induction on the length of derivations P in D. Let the
claim hold for P (1..i) and let P (i + 1) = −∆p. Further let E be an extension of
T (D). Then E = In(Π) for a closed and successful process Π of T (D).
By the inference condition (−∆) we know p 6∈ F , thus fact(p) 6∈W (D). (∗)
Also we know ∀r ∈ Rs[p]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i). By induction Hypothesis we
conclude
∀r ∈ Rs[p]∃a ∈ A(r) : definitely(a) 6∈ In(Π) (**)
22 G. Antoniou, D. Billington, G. Governatori and M.J. Maher
(∗) and (∗∗) show that neither d1 nor d2 can be used to derive definitely(p) in Π.
But these are, by construction of T (D), the only possibilities. Thus definitely(p) 6∈
In(Π) = E.
(c): Let definitely(p) ∈ E for an extension E of T (D). Such an extension exists
becauseD is decisive. Then, by part (b) we conclude D 6⊢ −∆p. ThereforeD ⊢ +∆p
because D is decisive. Thus the opposite of (a) holds. The opposite of (b) is shown
in an analogous way.
Consider D = { ⇒ p, p ⇒ q, q ⇒ ¬p}. As we have shown in section A.3, T (D)
has no extension, so definitely(p) is included in all extensions of T (D). However
D 6⊢ +∆p. Thus the opposite of (a) does not hold, in general.
Consider the theory D consisting only of the strict rule p→ p. T (D) has only one
extension, E = Th(∅), and definitely(p) 6∈ E. However D 6⊢ −∆p. This shows
that the opposite of (b) is not true, in general.
Theorem 5.3
(a) If D ⊢ +∂p then defeasibly(p) is included in all stable models of M.
(b) If D ⊢ −∂p then defeasibly(p) is not included in any stable model of M.
(c) If D is decisive then the implications (a) and (b) are also true in the opposite
direction.
Proof
(c): Let defeasibly(p) ∈ E for an extension E of T (D). Such an extension exists
because D is decisive. Then, by part (b) we conclude D 6⊢ −∂p. Therefore D ⊢ +∂p
because D is decisive. Thus the opposite of (a) holds. The opposite of (b) is shown
in an analogous way.
Let D consist of the rules: p ⇒ p, p ⇒ q and ⇒ ¬q. Then defeasibly(¬q) is
included in the only extension of T (D) but D 6⊢ ¬q. This shows that the opposite
of (a) is not necessarily true if D is not decisive.
A counterexample for the opposite direction of (b) is the defeasible theory con-
sisting only of the rule p⇒ p. defeasibly(p) is not included in the only extension
of T (D), however −∂p cannot be derived from D.
Parts (a) and (b) are shown concurrently by induction on the length of a deriva-
tion P in D. Suppose (a) and (b) hold for P (1..i) (Induction Hypothesis). Consider
an extension E of T (D), and let E = In(Π) for a closed and successful process Π
of T (D).
Case +∂: P (i+ 1) = +∂p. By the inference condition (+∂) there are two cases.
The first case is that +∆p ∈ P (1..i). By Theorem 5.2, definitely(p) ∈ E = In(Π).
Then the default d3 (with instantiation p for X) is applicable to In(Π). Since Π is
closed we conclude defeasibly(p) ∈ In(Π) = E.
The second case is as follows:
(1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
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(3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
From (2) we conclude
definitely(∼p) 6∈ In(Π) = E (*)
using Theorem A.2. From (1) we get
supportive rule(r, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) ∈W (D) (**)
From (1) and Induction Hypothesis we get
defeasibly(qi) ∈ In(Π), for all i = 1, . . . , n (***)
In the following we show that overruled(r, p) 6∈ In(Π). Together with (∗)-(∗ ∗ ∗) it
shows that the default d4 (with instantiation p for X) is applicable to In(Π). Since
Π is closed we get defeasibly(p) ∈ In(Π) = E.
Consider s ∈ R[∼p]. In case (3.1) holds we have −∂a ∈ P (1..i) for an a ∈ A(s).
By Induction Hypothesis we conclude defeasibly(a) 6∈ In(Π) = E. Thus default
d5 cannot be applied with s instantiated for S.
In case (3.2) holds, it is easily seen that default d6 can be used for the derivation
of defeated(s,∼p). Thus defeated(s,∼p) ∈ In(Π), and d5 cannot be applied with
s instantiated for S.
Overall we have shown that d5 fails to derive overruled(r, p).
Case −∂: Let P (i + 1) = −∂p. From the (−∂) inference condition we know
−∆ ∈ P (1..i). Therefore, by Theorem A.2, definitely(p) 6∈ E = In(Π). Thus
default d3 cannot be used to derive defeasibly(p) in Π.
Next we show that d4 cannot be used, either, to derive defeasibly(p) in Π. Then
defeasibly(p) 6∈ In(Π) = E, and we are finished. By the (−∂) inference condition
there are three cases.
Case 1: ∀r ∈ Rsd[p]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i). By Induction Hypothesis we
conclude that for every strict or defeasible rule with head p there is at least one
antecedent a such that defeasibly(a) 6∈ In(Π). Therefore, for every possible in-
stantiation of R in default d4 the prerequisite of d4 is not in In(Π). Thus d4 cannot
be used to derive defeasibly(p) in Π.
Case 2: +∆∼p ∈ P (1..i). Then no instantiation of d4 where the consequent
is defeasibly(p) can be applied since ∼p ∈ In(Π) = E, by Theorem A.2 (and
because Π is successful).
Case 3: There is s ∈ R[∼p] such that:
(1) ∀a ∈ A(s) + ∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[p] : t 6> s or ∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i)
From (1) together with Induction Hypothesis we get:
rule(s,∼p, [u1, . . . , un]) ∧ defeasibly(u1) ∧ . . . ∧ defeasibly(un) ∈ In(Π) (*)
Let t ∈ Rsd[p].
Case 3.1: t 6> s. Then sup(t, s) 6∈W (D). So, d6 with instantiation t for T cannot
be used to derive defeated(s,∼p) in Π.
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Case 3.2: ∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we have
defeasibly(a) 6∈ In(Π). Again, d6 with instantiation t for T cannot be used to
derive defeated(s,∼p) in Π.
Overall we have shown:
defeated(s,∼p) 6∈ In(Π) (**)
From (∗) and (∗∗) we get that d5 with instantiation s for S and r for R can be
applied to In(Π). Since Π is closed, we conclude overruled(r, p) ∈ In(Π). Since r
was chosen arbitrarily, the default d4 cannot be used to prove defeasibly(p) in Π,
thus defeasibly(p) 6∈ E = In(Π).
The above two theorems show that if D is decisive, then the stable model seman-
tics ofM corresponds to the provability in defeasible logic. However part (c) is not
true in the general case, as the following example shows.
Example 5.1
Consider the defeasible theory
r1 : ⇒ ¬p
r2 : p⇒ p
In defeasible logic, +∂¬p cannot be proven because we cannot derive −∂p. How-
ever, defeasibly(¬p) is a sceptical conclusion of M under stable model semantics
because it is included in the only stable model of M. ✷
5.3 Embedding under Kunen Semantics
If we wish to have an equivalence result without the condition of decisiveness, then
we must use a different logic programming semantics, namely Kunen semantics.
The domain of our interpretation is given by the set of the rule-names and the
set of literals occurring in a defeasible theory D.
• I(α) = t iff
1. α = fact(p) and p ∈ F ;
2. α = strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn → p ∈ R;
3. α = defeasible(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn ⇒ p ∈ R;
4. α = defeater(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn ❀ p ∈ R;
5. α = sup(ri, rj) and 〈ri, rj〉 ∈>.
• I(α) = f iff
1. α = fact(p) and p /∈ F ;
2. α = strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn → p /∈ R;
3. α = defeasible(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn ⇒ p /∈ R;
4. α = defeater(ri, p, [q1, . . . , qn]) and ri : q1, . . . , qn ❀ p /∈ R;
5. α = sup(ri, rj) and 〈ri, rj〉 /∈>.
• I(α) = u otherwise.
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The intuition behind this interpretation is that the predicates correspond to the
elements of D.
It is immediate to see that
I(supportive rule(ri, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) =
{
t ri ∈ Rsd[p] and q1, . . . , ql = A(ri)
f otherwise
Similarly
I(rule(ri, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) =
{
t r ∈ R[p] and q1, . . . , ql = A(ri)
f otherwise
Theorem 5.4
(a) D ⊢ +∆p ⇔ M |=K definitely(p).
(b) D ⊢ −∆p ⇔ M |=K ¬ definitely(p).
(c) D ⊢ +∂p ⇔ M |=K defeasibly(p).
(b) D ⊢ −∂p ⇔ M |=K ¬ defeasibly(p).
Proof
Case 1, ⇒. We prove it by induction on the construction of +∆.
Inductive base.
p ∈ +∆1 iff p ∈ F or → p ∈ R, iff I(fact(p)) = t or I(strict(r, p, [ ])) = t,
so either one of the ground instance definitely(p) :- fact(p) of the clause c1 or
definitely(p) :- strict(r, p, [ ]) of the clause c2 implies I1(definitely(p)) = t.
Inductive step. Let us assume that the property holds up to n, and p ∈ +∆n+1.
This means that either
1. p ∈ F , for which we can repeat the same argument as the inductive base; or
2. ∃r ∈ Rs[p], say ri such that A(ri) ⊆ +∆n. This implies that, for some m
Im(strict(ri, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = t ,
and, by inductive hypothesis, for each qj (1 ≤ j ≤ l)
Im(definitely(qj)) = t .
Thus, by clause c2, Im+1(definitely(p)) = t.
Case 1, ⇐. We use induction on the steps on which definitely(p) is supported.
Inductive base. In this case we have
I1(definitely(p)) = t iff


definitely(p) :- fact(p) and I(fact(p)) = t
definitely(p) :- strict(r, p, [ ]) and
I(strict(r, p, [ ])) = t
The first case amounts to p ∈ F , but F ⊆ ∆n, for any n, therefore p ∈ +∆F . In
the second case we have a rule r such that A(r) = ∅ and so A(r) ⊆ +∆n, for any
n, hence p ∈ +∆F .
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Inductive step. Let us assume that the property holds up to n, and
In+1(definitely(p)) = t.
This is possible if there is either a ground instance of clause c1 definitely(p) :-
fact(p), for which we repeat the argument of the inductive base, or a ground
instance
definitely(p):-
strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql]),
definitely(q1), . . . , definitely(qn).
of clause c2 such that
In(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = t ,
which implies r ∈ Rs[p], and, for each qi,
In(definitely(qi)) = t .
By inductive hypothesis, for some m, qi ∈ +∆m, so A(r) ⊆ +∆m; therefore p ∈
+∆m+1; hence p ∈ +∆F .
Case 2, ⇒. Also in this case we use induction on the construction of −∆.
Inductive base. If p ∈ −∆ then
1. p /∈ F , but p /∈ F iff I(fact(p)) = f ; this implies that all instances of c1 fails;
or
2. ∀r ∈ Rs[p](A(r) ∩ −∆0 6= ∅). Given −∆0 = ∅, the sentence A(r) ∩ −∆0 6= ∅
is always false, therefore the condition can be satisfied only vacuously. This
means Rs[p] = ∅, which implies
I(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = f ,
from which it follows that all ground instances of c2 fail.
Since definitely(p) fails in all the cases we conclude I1(definitely(p)) = f , and
I1(not definitely(p)) = t.
Inductive step. Let us assume that the property holds up to n, p /∈ −∆n, and p ∈
−∆n+1. This implies that p /∈ F , so we can repeat the above argument for the first
clause. If ∀r ∈ Rs[p](A(r)∩∆n 6= ∅) is satisfied, we have two cases: if it is vacuously
we use the argument of the inductive base, otherwise, for each rule r, A(r)∩−∆n =
qi. From this we know that qi ∈ −∆n, and we can apply the inductive hypothesis;
thus for some m, Im(not definitely(qi)) = t, then Im(definitely(qi)) = f .
This happens for each instance of clause c2, so Im+1(definitely(p)) = f , therefore
In+1(not definitely(p)) = t.
Case 2, ⇐. The proof is by induction on the step on which not strictly(p) is
supported.
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Inductive base: n = 1.
I1(not definitely(p)) = t ⇐⇒ I1(definitely(p)) = f
⇐⇒


1) I(fact(p)) = f , and
2) ∀q, r, I(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql]),
definitely(q1), . . . ,
definitely(ql)) = f
1) implies p /∈ F ; for 2), since definitely is not a primitive predicate
I(definitely(p)) = u
for every p, thus
I(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = f
for every q, r; this implies Rs[p] = ∅, therefore p ∈ −∆1.
Inductive step. Let us assume that it holds up to n. We can repeat the above
reasoning, but we have to consider also the case where for each rule ri ∈ Rs[p]
and some qj ∈ A(r), In(definitely(qj)) = f . So In(not definitely(qj)) = t; by
inductive hypothesis, qj ∈ −∆F , then A(r) ∩ −∆F 6= ∅. Let −∆m be smallest set
satisfying this property. By construction we have p ∈ −∆m+1, hence p ∈ −∆F .
Cases 3 and 4 (⇒): Inductive base. The inductive base is trivial since it is easy
to verify that both +∂1 and −∂1 are empty.
Inductive step. We assume that the theorem holds up to +∂n and −∂n.
Case p ∈ +∂n+1. If p ∈ +∂n+1 because p ∈ +∆n, then we can use the following
ground instance of clause c1
defeasibly(p) :- definitely(p).
By the inductive hypothesis Im(definitely(p)) = t, for some appropriatem, hence
Im+1(defeasibly(p)) = t.
Otherwise, there is a rule r ∈ Rsd[p] such that (1) A(r) ⊆ +∂n and ∼p ∈ −∆n,
and (2) for every rule s ∈ R[∼p] either (a) A(s) ∩ −∂n 6= ∅ or (b) there is rule
t ∈ Rsd[p] such that A(t) ⊆ +∂n and t > s.
Let us consider an appropriate ground instance of clause c4:
defeasibly(p) :- supportive rule(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql]),
not defeasibly(∼p),
defeasibly(q1), . . . , defeasibly(ql),
not overruled(r, p).
By construction I(supportive rule(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = t, and by the inductive
hypothesis and (1), for some appropriate m, Im(not definitely(p)) = t (from
∼p ∈ −∆n), Im(defeasibly(qi)) = t for all qi ∈ A(r) since A(r) ⊆ +∂n, Therefore
we have to show that
Im(notoverruled(r, p)) = t .
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This is equivalent to Im(overruled(r, p)) = f , that means that all the bodies of the
appropriate ground instances of clause c5 are false in Im. By construction for all
rules r ∈ R[∼p], I(rule(s,∼p, [qs1, . . . , q
s
l ])) = t. Thus we have to prove that either
Im(defeasibly(q
s
i )) = f or Im(not defeated(s,∼p)) = f .
Let us partition R[∼p] in two sets S′ = {s ∈ R[∼p] : A(s) ∩ −∂n = ∅} and
S′′ = R[∼p] − S′. By (2a) and the inductive hypothesis we have that for every
s ∈ S′
Im(defeasibly(q
s
i )) = f
for some qsi ∈ A(s). For the rules in S
′′, on the other hand, we have to prove that
Im(not defeated(s,∼p)) = f .
Im(not defeated(s,∼p)) = f iff Im(defeated(s,∼p)) = t .
Hence we need a ground instance of clause c6 evaluated as true in Im. By (2b) for
every rule in S′′ there is a rule t ∈ Rsd[p] such that A(t) ⊆ +∂n and t > s. By
construction we obtain
I(supportive rule(t, p, [qt1, . . . , q
t
l ])) = t and I(supportive rule(t, s)) = t,
and by the inductive hypothesis, for all qti ∈ A(t), Im(defeasibly(q
t
i)) = t.
Case p ∈ −∂n+1. We have to show that not defeasibly(p) is supported by the
Kunen semantics. This means that for somem, Im(not defeasibly(p)) = t, which
implies Im(defeasibly(p)) = f . Accordingly we have to show that for each instance
of clauses c3 and c4 an element of the body is not supported by the semantics.
Let us examine clause c3:
defeasibly(p) :- definitely(p).
But −∂n+1 ⊆ −∆n, therefore p ∈ −∆n. By the inductive hypothesis, for some m,
Im(not definitely(p)) = t and Im(definitely(p)) = f .
For clause c4
defeasibly(p) :-
supportive rule(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql]),
not definitely(∼p),
defeasibly(q1), . . . , defeasibly(ql),
not overruled(r, p).
Let us examine the cases that imply that p ∈ −∂n+1.
If ∼p ∈ +∆n, then, by the inductive hypothesis Im(definitely(∼p)) = t and
Im(not definitely(∼p)) = f .
From the basic interpretation it is obvious that we have to consider only the
rules for p, since I(supportive rule(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = t only if r ∈ Rsd[p]. Let
us partition Rsd[p] as follows: R
′ = {r ∈ Rsd : A(r) ∩−∂n 6= ∅}, and R′′ = R−R′.
If r ∈ R′, then by the inductive hypothesis, for some qi ∈ A(r),
Im(not defeasibly(qi)) = t and Im(defeasibly(qi)) = f .
If r ∈ R′′, then we have to show that, for some m, Im(not overruled(r, p)) = f .
This means that Im(overruled(r, p)) = t.
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Let us examine again a relevant instance of clause c5:
overruled(r, p) :-
rule(s,∼p, [qs1, . . . , q
s
l ]),
defeasibly(qs1), . . . , defeasibly(q
s
l ),
not defeated(s,∼p).
Since p ∈ −∂n+1, there is a rule s such that s ∈ R[∼p] and A(s) ⊆ +∂n. By
construction I(rule(s,∼p, [qs1, . . . , q
s
l ])) = t, and by the inductive hypothesis, for
every qsi ∈ A(s):
Im(defeasibly(q
s
i )) = t .
Hence we have to show that I(not defeated(s,∼p)) = t, i.e. I(defeated(s,∼p)) =
f , from which we know that all appropriate substitutions of clause c6 fail.
defeated(s,∼p) :-
supportive rule(t, p, [qt1, . . . , q
t
l ]),
defeasibly(qt1), . . . , defeasibly(q
t
l ),
sup(t, s).
As we have seen R[p] 6= ∅, thus we consider two cases: i) t ∈ R′, and ii) t ∈ R′′.
If t ∈ R′, then, by the inductive hypothesis, there exists a qti ∈ A(t) such that
Im(defeasibly(q
t
i)) = f .
If t ∈ R′′, since p ∈ −∂n+1, we have that t 6> s, thus I(sup(t, s) = f). We have
proved that Im(defeated(s,∼p)) = f , which then imply Im(overruled(r, p)) = t.
Thus, in all cases, Im(defeasibly(p)) = f and Im(not defeasibly(p)) = t.
Inductive base, ⇐. For the inductive base we consider the literals supported
by I1; however, according to clause c3 and clause c4, no literal defeasibly(p) /
not defeasibly(p) is supported by I1, thus we consider only definitely(p) and
not definitely(p).
If definitely(p) is supported by I1 we have to analyse two cases, a successful
instance of clause c1
definitely(p) :- fact(p).
or a successful instance of clause c2 with the following form:
definitely(p) :- strict(r, p, [ ])).
In the first case I(fact(p)) = t and so p ∈ F and F ⊆ +∆m, for every m. In the
second case we a rule r ∈ Rs[p] such that, trivially A(r) ⊆ +∆
0. Hence p ∈ +∆F .
On the other hand I1(not definitely(p)) = t iff I1(definitely(p)) = f . This
means that all appropriate substitution of the clauses c1 and c2 fail. From clause
c1 we obtain I(fact(p)) = f and so p /∈ F . The only case when c2 fails wrt I is
when I(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) is false for all r, p, q. This implies that Rs[p] = ∅.
It is now immediate to verify that the two conditions imply that p ∈ −∆1, and by
the monotonicity of T , p ∈ −∆F .
Inductive step. We assume that the property holds up to In, and we only show
the cases different from the inductive base.
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Case In+1(definitely(p)) = t. Let us consider the following instance of clause
c2:
definitely(p) :-
strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql]),
definitely(q1), . . . , definitely(qn).
Here In(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) = t, and for all qi ∈ A(r), In(definitely(qi)) =
t. By construction r ∈ Rs[p], and by the inductive hypothesis A(r) ⊆ +∆F .
Case In+1(not definitely(p)) = f . Besides the cases of the inductive base we
have to consider all ground substitutions of c2 where In(strict(r, p, [q1, . . . , ql])) =
t. It follows that for some qi ∈ A(r), In(definitely(qi)) = f . By the inductive
hypothesis qi ∈ −∆F , hence for some m, for all r ∈ Rs[p], A(r) ∩−∆m 6= ∅. Hence
p ∈ −∆F .
Case In+1(defeasibly(p)) = t. We have to consider two cases¿ The first corre-
sponds to the following clause:
defeasibly(p) :- definitely(p).
Here In(definitely(p)) = t, therefore, by the inductive hypothesis p ∈ +∆F , thus
there is an m such that p ∈ +∆m, and consequently p ∈ +∂m, and p ∈ +∂F .
Otherwise we have
defeasibly(p) :- not definitely(∼p),
supportive rule(r, p, [qr1, . . . , q
r
l ]),
defeasibly(qr1), . . . , defeasibly(q
r
l ),
not overruled(r, p).
where In(not definitely(∼p)) = t, In(supportive rule(r, p, [q
r
1 , . . . , q
r
l ])) = t,
and for all qri s, In(defeasibly(q
r
i )) = t. By construction and the inductive hypothe-
sis ∼p ∈ +∆F , ∃r ∈ Rsd[p], and A(r) ⊆ +∂F . Moreover In(not overruled(r, p)) =
t, and therefore In(overruled(r, p)) = f . This means that all substitutions of clause
c5 are evaluated as false in In.
If In(rule(s,∼p, [qs1, . . . , q
s
l ])) = f , then R[∼p] = ∅, and then trivially p ∈ +∂F .
Otherwise we consider the substitutions such that In(rule(s,∼p, [qs1, . . . , q
s
l ])) =
t. For such substitutions either
In(defeasibly(q
s
i )) = f , for some q
s
i ,
or
In(not defeated(s,∼p)) = f .
In the first case, by the inductive hypothesis, qsi ∈ −∂F . In the second case
In(defeated(s,∼q)) = t. This implies In(supportive rule(t, p, [qt1, . . . , q
t
l ])) = t,
In(defeasibly(q
t
i)) = t for all q
t
i ∈ A(t), and In(supportive rule(t > s)) = t.
Therefore, by construction and the inductive hypothesis, we obtain
∀s ∈ R[∼p] either A(s) ∩ −∂F 6= ∅ or ∃t ∈ Rsd[p] : A(t) ⊆ +∂F , t > s .
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This implies that there is a suitable m where all those conditions are satisfied and
hence p ∈ +∂m+1, and consequently p ∈ +∂F .
Case In+1(not defeasibly(p)) = t. The proof of this case is analogous to the
previous case. Indeed the proof of not defeasibly(p) corresponds to the construc-
tive negation of defeasibly(p), and the conditions for p ∈ −∂n+1 are the negation
of those for p ∈ +∂n+1.
6 Conclusion
We motivated and presented a translation of defeasible theories into logic programs,
such that the defeasible conclusions of the former correspond exactly with the
sceptical conclusions of the latter under the stable model semantics, if a condition
of decisiveness is satisfied. If decisiveness is not satisfied, we have to use Kunen
semantics instead for a complete characterization.
This paper closes an important gap in the theory of nonmonotonic reasoning, in
that it relates defeasible logic with mainstream semantics of logic programming.
This result is particularly important, since defeasible reasoning is one of the most
successful nonmonotonic reasoning paradigms in applications.
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